Libya, Revisited

It is an apt time to revisit the issue of Libya. Despite claims that the opposite might happen, despite the setbacks that the rebels have faced, it seems very likely now that they have broken through to Tripoli that Muammar Gaddafi is finally finished. Even if he himself is not arrested or killed, his regime is all but dead. Having allowed the rebels to enter and take significant parts of the capital, the soon-to-be former Libyan government can do nothing to stop the advance of rebel troops. The implications this has for the country and for the region, are, of course, astounding.

First, let us examine the consequences for Libya. In almost any situation, the end of a dictator's rule never completely marks the transition to freedom. Indeed, in the case of Libya, the gap between Gaddafi being forced from power and even something resembling a stable, freer government is difficult to accomplish. Libya's eccentric autocrat was not simply crazy, but was also smart: he had weakened many national institutions that would normally unite the country in his departure, meaning that much of the law and order that could be ensured depended entirely on him. The army was not uniformly treated well: Gaddafi saved the best training and equipment for members of his tribe and foreign militiamen from Africa. This is indicative of a broader cunning on his part: recognizing that the country he ruled contained many different tribal groups, he had set up his power in such a way that none of these groups could ever be united anywhere, except, ironically enough, against Gaddafi.

This problem is not unique to Libya, of course. Plenty of countries in Africa have great difficulties with diverse ethnic groups. Yet those countries do not give much hope for a post dictatorship Libya. Indeed, even the most stable of these countries, Kenya, faced a sustained period of ethnic violence as recently as 2007. Libya, unless it performs a genocide, will have an even worse problem: the tribe that Gaddafi belonged to will still be around, meaning that trouble will be built into the new Libya.

Of course, not all of the news is bad. That there are no prevailing institutions means that there is a higher chance that the rule of law and government itself can become established, instead of, say, the police or military. The latter two generally lead to police states or military juntas and having institutions stronger than the leaders of the new transitional government could have undermined any gains in freedom that Libyans would have won. Moreover though, the behavior of the transitional council has been promising. Though they have little ground to deviate from, it would appear that the new Libyan government is on the right path.

Challenges still remain. Gaddafi himself is not accounted for, and his forces still control parts of the country. Indeed, even Tripoli has neighborhood still loyal to him. The new government has to rebuild an economy, win back the rest of the country, and establish an entirely new constitution and institutions, among other weighty agenda items. In this regard, foreign aid and assistance will be crucial. Yet we can take hope: it appears that, for the moment, everything is going well.